Takfiri Wahhabism: Narcissism of Minor Differences in the Middle Eastern Geopolitical Arena

The modern Middle East’s political and ideological divisions are primarily shaped by the calculated use of religious identity and rivalry by Arab monarchies, who instrumentalize Wahhabism—especially its Takfiri form—to consolidate power and counter Iran’s revolutionary influence. Far from being mere theological or colonial byproducts, these strategies deliberately exploit sectarianism and collective narcissism to reinforce intra-Muslim conflict and preserve monarchical authority.

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This article contends that Arab monarchies, most notably Saudi Arabia, strategically deploy ‘Takfiri Wahhabism’—a politicized Sunni Islamic doctrine—to consolidate power at home and counter Iran’s revolutionary threat abroad. This calculated instrumentalization of religious ideology heightens sectarian (Sunni-Shia) and ethnic (Arab-Persian) divisions, drawing on collective narcissism and the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ to maintain domestic authority and regional dominance. By foregrounding these motives, the analysis exposes how identity manipulation is central to current Middle Eastern fault lines.

Key Terms used:

Takfir: The act of declaring another Muslim an unbeliever (kafir), often leading to excommunication and justifying violence against them.

Wahhabism: A strict Sunni revivalist movement from 18th-century Najd, founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It stresses pure monotheism, rejects innovation, and interprets scripture literally. Its alliance with the House of Saud built modern Saudi Arabia.

Takfiri Wahhabism: A more extreme, politicized offshoot that readily employs takfir against Muslims deemed insufficiently orthodox, particularly Shia Muslims, but also other Sunnis. It forms a key ideological component of many jihadist groups.

Collective Narcissism: A group-level construct characterized by an unrealistic, inflated belief in the group’s exceptionalism, entitlement, and a need for external validation, coupled with hypersensitivity to perceived slights or threats to the group’s image. (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). The massacre in Gaza, American exceptionalism, and imperialist conflicts around the world are all examples of this collective narcissism.

Narcissism of Minor Differences: A concept Sigmund Freud explored, suggesting that communities with closely related identities often harbor the most intense mutual hostility and antagonism precisely because of their similarities, requiring heightened differentiation to maintain distinct group boundaries (Freud, 1917/1957).

Identity Politics: Political activity centered around the interests and perspectives of social groups defined by shared characteristics like religion, sect, or ethnicity, often emphasizing difference and competition for resources and recognition. Again Zionism is a form of idenditity politics.

This article will trace the historical evolution of Wahhabism from a regional revivalist movement to a tool of state power. It will analyze how Arab monarchies, primarily Saudi Arabia, have strategically amplified their Takfiri elements to contain Iran’s geopolitical and ideological reach, fostering sectarianism and Arab-Persian dichotomies. Examining this through the lens of collective narcissism and the “narcissism of minor differences” reveals the psychological and political mechanisms driving intragroup conflict within the broader Muslim ummah. Case studies of specific conflicts will illustrate the devastating real-world consequences of this strategy. The conclusion will summarize the argument and suggest avenues for further research on identity manipulation in geopolitics.

Historical Context: From Revivalist Movement to Geopolitical Tool

The origins of Wahhabism lie in the mid-18th century alliance between the religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the tribal leader Muhammad ibn Saud. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to purify Arabian Islam from practices he deemed polytheistic (shirk) or innovative (bid’ah), such as the veneration of saints, Sufi rituals, and certain Shia practices. His doctrine emphasized a return to a perceived pristine Islam of the Salaf (pious predecessors). Crucially, this doctrine included the concept of takfir against Muslims who engaged in these practices, providing a theological justification for military campaigns against neighboring tribes and settlements.

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The first Saudi state (1744-1818) expanded rapidly, conquering Mecca and Medina. Its destruction by Ottoman-Egyptian forces under Muhammad Ali Pasha was partly motivated by the Wahhabi desecration of holy sites in the Hejaz and the challenge they posed to Ottoman religious authority. The second Saudi state (1824-1891) also collapsed due to internal strife. The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, established by Abdulaziz ibn Saud between 1902 and 1932, was built upon the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance. Wahhabi clerics (ulema) provided religious legitimacy for conquest and rule, while the Al Saud provided protection and patronage. Wahhabism became the state’s official religious doctrine, enforced by a powerful religious establishment.

For decades, Saudi Arabia’s use of Wahhabism was primarily inward-focused, a tool for domestic consolidation and social control. However, two pivotal events catalyzed its transformation into a key instrument of foreign policy:

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1. The Iranian Revolution (1979): The overthrow of the Shah and establishment of a Shia theocracy under Ayatollah Khomeini sent shockwaves through the Sunni Arab monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia. Khomeini explicitly challenged the Saudi monarchy’s legitimacy as custodians of Islam’s holiest sites, accusing them of being un-Islamic puppets of the West. Iran actively promoted its revolutionary model, supporting Shia groups across the region. This posed an existential ideological and geopolitical threat.

2. The Seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca (1979): Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia faced a severe internal challenge from Juhayman al-Otaybi and his followers, who seized the Grand Mosque, accusing the Saudi royal family of corruption, impiety, and abandoning true Wahhabi principles. This event traumatized the regime, demonstrating the potential for its own legitimizing ideology to be turned against it by more radical elements.

In response to this dual pressure – the external Shia revolutionary threat and the internal Sunni ultra-conservative challenge – the Saudi state adopted a multi-pronged strategy. Domestically, it appeased its conservative religious base by enforcing stricter social codes.

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Internationally, it embarked on a massive campaign to export its state-sanctioned version of Wahhabism, significantly amplified in its anti-Shia rhetoric, as a bulwark against Iranian influence. Vast oil wealth funded the construction of mosques, madrasas (religious schools), and cultural centers worldwide, disseminating Wahhabi literature and preachers (Roy, 2004; Al-Rasheed, 2007). This period saw the deliberate amplification of the takfiri dimension within the exported ideology, particularly targeting Shia Islam as inherently heretical and a tool of Persian (Iranian) expansionism.

Political Strategy: Weaponizing Doctrine to Contain Iran

The core of Saudi Arabia’s (and, to varying degrees, other Gulf monarchies’) strategy involved leveraging Wahhabism, specifically its Takfiri strand, as a political weapon to counter Iran’s influence. This manifested in several key ways:

1. Sectarianization of Geopolitics: Saudi Arabia actively framed the regional power struggle not primarily in geopolitical or national terms, but as a fundamental, centuries-old sectarian conflict between “true” Sunni Islam (represented by Saudi Arabia and its allies) and heretical Shia Islam (represented by Iran and its proxies). This narrative served to delegitimize Iranian actions and rally Sunni populations across the region behind Saudi leadership, regardless of their own political grievances with their governments or the West. The inherent takfiri tendency within politicized Wahhabism provided the theological underpinning for this framing, casting Shia as rafidha (rejecters) outside the fold of Islam (Nasr, 2006).

2. Counter-Revolutionary Ideology: Iran’s revolutionary ideology threatened monarchical systems. Saudi Arabia promoted its Wahhabi doctrine as the authentic, stable, traditional alternative to Iran’s revolutionary Shia Islam. It presented itself as the guardian of Sunni orthodoxy against Shia subversion. This was not merely theological; it was a direct counter to Iran’s calls for the overthrow of monarchies. Funding Wahhabi institutions globally served to propagate this counter-revolutionary message.

3. Creating and Empowering Sunni Proxies: To counter Iranian-backed Shia militias (like Hezbollah) and governments (like post-2003 Iraq and Syria under Assad), Saudi Arabia and its allies financed, armed, and politically supported Sunni groups aligned with their Wahhabi ideology. This included:

Legitimist Actors: Supporting established Sunni religious institutions and political parties promoting conservative, anti-Shia views (e.g., certain factions in Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan).

Non-State Armed Groups: In conflicts like Syria and post-2014 Iraq, support flowed to various Sunni rebel factions, many of whom espoused Salafi-jihadist or Takfiri ideologies. While Saudi Arabia officially distanced itself from groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, the broader ecosystem of sectarianism it fostered created fertile ground for such extremism (Hegghammer, 2010). The focus was on countering Iranian influence, often prioritizing sectarian alignment over ideological purity or democratic principles.

4. Amplifying the Arab-Persian Divide: Closely linked to sectarianization was the deliberate emphasis on an ethnic divide. Iranian influence was portrayed not just as Shia, but as specifically Persian expansionism threatening the Arab world. Saudi Arabia positioned itself as the leader of the Arab nation, defending against Persian/Iranian hegemony. This narrative tapped into deep-seated historical Arab-Persian tensions and appealed to Arab nationalist sentiments, further differentiating “us” (Sunni Arabs) from “them” (Shia Persians/Iranians) (Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, 2006).

This strategy aimed to contain Iran by mobilizing Sunni populations, isolating Shia communities, rallying Arab states under Saudi leadership, and creating a sectarian balance of power unfavorable to Tehran.

Intragroup Dynamics: Collective Narcissism and the Manufacture of Difference

The effectiveness of this strategy hinges critically on manipulating group psychology, particularly through the mechanisms of collective narcissism and the “narcissism of minor differences.”

Wahhabism as a Source of Collective Narcissism: State-sponsored Wahhabism promotes an exclusive claim to religious truth. It fosters a belief in the unique purity and superiority of its interpretation of Islam, positioning its adherents as the “saved sect.” This creates a foundation for collective narcissism – an inflated sense of Sunni (specifically Wahhabi-aligned) exceptionalism and entitlement to dominance within the Muslim world and regional politics (Golec de Zavala, 2011). The custodianship of Mecca and Medina further fuels this sense of unique religious status and responsibility.

The “Narcissism of Minor Differences” Applied: Freud’s concept is acutely relevant. Sunni and Shia Muslims share the fundamental tenets of Islam: belief in one God (Allah), the Quran as revelation, Muhammad as the final prophet, and the Five Pillars. The theological differences, while significant to religious scholars, are minor compared to the differences between Islam and other world religions. Yet, precisely because of this underlying similarity, the need to assert distinctiveness becomes paramount for group identity, especially when mobilized for political ends. Politicized Takfiri Wahhabism hyper-focuses on these minor differences – interpretations of early Islamic history, the status of certain companions of the Prophet, practices like commemoration of Ashura or visiting shrines – transforming them into absolute, existential boundaries (Volkan, 1988). Declaring Shia as kuffar (unbelievers) based on these differences is the ultimate manifestation of this narcissistic need for differentiation.

Sectarianism as Identity Reinforcement: By constantly emphasizing the “threat” of the Shia “other” (portrayed as inherently disloyal, heretical, and agents of Iran), the Saudi-led narrative reinforces in-group cohesion among Sunnis. It creates a common enemy, diverting attention from internal socio-economic or political grievances within Sunni-majority states (e.g., authoritarianism, corruption, inequality) and redirecting frustration towards an externalized sectarian “other.” This manufactured conflict serves to strengthen the position of ruling elites who present themselves as the protectors of the Sunni community (Hashemi & Postel, 2017).

Sensitivity and Aggression: Collective narcissism predicts hypersensitivity to perceived threats to the group’s image or status. Iran’s assertion of leadership, its support for Shia groups, and its challenge to Saudi religious authority are interpreted not just as geopolitical competition but as profound insults to the Sunni/Wahhabi self-image. This fuels aggressive responses, including sectarian rhetoric, support for discriminatory policies against Shia minorities within Arab states, and backing for armed groups engaged in sectarian violence.

This dynamic transforms theological nuances into rigid, politically charged fault lines, facilitating the manipulation of populations and justifying policies aimed at containing Iran through division.

Case Studies: The Devastating Consequences

The instrumentalization of Takfiri Wahhabism has fueled conflicts across the region, exacerbating existing tensions and creating new ones:

1. Syria (2011-Present): The Syrian conflict began as a popular uprising against the Assad regime (dominated by the Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam). Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey heavily supported Sunni rebel factions seeking to overthrow Assad. While diverse initially, the conflict became intensely sectarianized. Significant funding and ideological support flowed to Salafi-jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda affiliate) and later ISIS, whose Takfiri ideology justified extreme violence against Shia, Alawites, and other minorities. Saudi rhetoric explicitly framed the war as a Sunni struggle against an Iranian-backed “heretical” regime. This sectarianization prolonged the conflict, empowered extremist groups, led to horrific atrocities, and cemented the alliance between Assad, Iran, and Hezbollah (Lister, 2015). It became a devastating proxy war fueled by sectarian ideology.

2. Iraq (Post-2003, Peaking 2013-2017): The US-led invasion dismantled the Sunni-dominated Ba’athist state, empowering the Shia majority. Saudi Arabia viewed the Shia-led government in Baghdad as an Iranian client. While not directly creating ISIS, the Saudi-promoted sectarian narrative, funding to hardline Sunni groups, and discrimination against Sunnis by the Maliki government created fertile ground for ISIS’s rise. ISIS’s core ideology is a hyper-Takfiri strand of Salafism that declares Shia to be apostates deserving of death. Its genocidal campaign against Shia, Yazidis, and others was justified through this lens. Saudi clerics had long propagated anti-Shia rhetoric within Iraq, contributing to the sectarian polarization ISIS exploited (Cockburn, 2015). The conflict became a brutal manifestation of the sectarian divide stoked by regional powers.

3. Bahrain (2011-Present): The Bahraini uprising, initially demanding democratic reforms and greater rights for the Shia majority (roughly 60-70% of citizens), was swiftly framed by the Sunni Al Khalifa monarchy and its Saudi backers as an Iranian-backed sectarian coup attempt. Saudi Arabia intervened militarily (GCC Peninsula Shield Force) to crush the protests. The regime intensified repression against the Shia population, demolishing mosques, arresting clerics and activists, and revoking citizenship. State media and government-aligned clerics consistently portrayed the Shia opposition as disloyal, inherently linked to Iran, and a threat to Sunni identity and rule. This narrative relied heavily on Wahhabi-influenced sectarianism to delegitimize legitimate political grievances and justify authoritarian crackdowns (Matthiesen, 2013).

4. Pakistan: Saudi funding over decades established thousands of Wahhabi-aligned madrasas in Pakistan, promoting a strict Deobandi/Salafi interpretation often laced with anti-Shia sentiment. This contributed significantly to the rise of violent sectarian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its offshoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), dedicated to targeting Shia Muslims. These groups receive ideological inspiration and, historically, some financial support from Gulf sources. Sectarian violence against Shia, particularly the Hazara community, remains a persistent problem in Pakistan, fueled by imported Takfiri ideologies (Zaman, 2002).

These cases illustrate how the political deployment of Takfiri Wahhabism transforms local conflicts or political struggles into existential sectarian battles, empowers extremists, causes immense human suffering, and serves the geopolitical aim of containing Iran by deepening the Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian divides.

In short, the politicization of Takfiri Wahhabism by Arab monarchies, primarily Saudi Arabia, represents a sophisticated, albeit destructive, geopolitical strategy rooted in countering Iranian influence and revolutionary ideology. By amplifying the takfiri dimension and sectarian rhetoric inherent within Wahhabism, these states have actively fostered a collective narcissism among Sunni populations, exploiting the “narcissism of minor differences” to transform theological distinctions into irreconcilable political and social chasms. The historical evolution of Wahhabism, from a regional revivalist movement to a cornerstone of Saudi state legitimacy and, crucially, a foreign policy tool post-1979, laid the groundwork for this strategy.

The consequences, as evidenced in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Pakistan, and beyond, have been catastrophic: prolonged conflicts, the empowerment of extremist groups like ISIS, widespread sectarian violence, massive humanitarian suffering, and the deepening of communal hatreds that will take generations to heal. While aimed at containing Iran, this strategy has often backfired, strengthening Iranian resolve, solidifying its alliances with Shia groups, and contributing to regional instability that threatens the security of the very states employing it.

The era of Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in Saudi Arabia presents a complex picture. While domestic social reforms moderate some aspects of Wahhabism’s social control, the geopolitical competition with Iran remains intense. The overt promotion of Takfiri ideology has diminished internationally due to its association with jihadist blowback (e.g., Al-Qaeda, ISIS), but the underlying sectarian framing of the rivalry persists. The emphasis on Arab identity and nationalism as a counter to Iran continues, demonstrating the enduring utility of identity politics, even if the specific religious rhetoric is modulated.

Understanding the mechanisms by which Takfiri Wahhabism has been weaponized through identity politics and collective narcissism is crucial not only for analyzing past and present conflicts but also for envisioning a less divided future for the Middle East. The human cost of exploiting religious differences for political gain remains a stark warning against the dangers of the narcissism of minor differences on a geopolitical scale.

References

Al-Rasheed, Madawi. (2007). Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation. Cambridge University Press.

Cockburn, Patrick. (2015). The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. Verso Books.

Freud, Sigmund. (1917/1957). “The Taboo of Virginity.” In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XI. Hogarth Press. (Concept of “narcissism of minor differences” appears here and elsewhere in Freud’s work).

Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective narcissism and its social consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(6), 1074–1096.

Golec de Zavala, A. (2011). Collective narcissism and intergroup hostility: The dark side of ‘in-group love’. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5(6), 309-320.

Hashemi, N., & Postel, D. (Eds.). (2017). Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East. Oxford University Press.

Hegghammer, Thomas. (2010). Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979. Cambridge University Press.

Lister, Charles R. (2015). The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency. Oxford University Press.

Matthiesen, Toby. (2013). Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t. Stanford University Press.

Nasr, Vali. (2006). The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. W.W. Norton & Company.

Roy, Olivier. (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. Columbia University Press.

Volkan, Vamik D. (1988). The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships. Jason Aronson.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. (2002). The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. Princeton University Press.